The Seizure of the Santo António at Patani. VOC Freebooting, the Estado da Índia and Peninsular Politics, 1602-1609

Historical Background

At the end of the sixteenth century, Dutch traders, initially under the flags of the voorcompagniën (regional overseas trading firms) and subsequently also under the banner of the United Dutch East India Company (commonly known by its original initials, VOC), arrived in the waters of insular and mainland Southeast Asia in search for trading opportunities. Their Portuguese competitors regarded this penetration into “their region” as a clear infringement of exclusive rights of trade which they historically asserted and defended by deed and word. The arrival of the Dutch marked the beginning of fierce competition for markets, political influence and military supremacy that would characterise and give shape to the history of the region in the final years of the sixteenth and the opening decades of the seventeenth century.

The heightened Luso-Dutch competition during this period expressed itself in various forms. The Portuguese flexed their military muscle, and more often than not, backed their show of might with hard-nosed diplomacy. In the first two decades of the seventeenth century, the VOC sought to gain a foothold and consolidate its role in the region. As is known from the histories of Europe, the Dutch fought a long and protracted war of “liberation” from Spanish “tyranny”, a process known as the Dutch Revolt. After Portugal was “conquered” in 1580 by Philip II of Spain, who thereafter ruled as Philip I of Portugal, the Hollanders’ war against Spain was extended to cover Portugal as well. With the inception of Dutch voyages to the East Indies, Hispano-Dutch and Luso-Dutch hostilities were further projected beyond Europe, including significantly Southeast Asia, a region which according to the Treaties of Tordesillas (1493) and Saragossa (1529) broadly fell into the Portuguese sphere of interest.

The projection of conflict from the European to the Asian scenario pursued two key strategies. The first was to inflict as much damage as possible to Portuguese and Spanish assets, both on land and at sea. The Dutch launched offensives on key Iberian positions, including the Moluccas, Manila, Macao and Malacca, scoring initial successes chiefly in the first-
mentioned region. At sea the Dutch attacked Portuguese merchant shipping bound from Hirado (“Firando”) and Macao to Malacca and Goa, and also Spanish galleons en route between Manila and the Mexican port of Acapulco.

The second aspect of Dutch policy was to contain the spread of Portuguese and Spanish influence. This was achieved by courting independent kings and princes in the region, and offering them “protection” and assistance against possible encroachment by the Iberian powers, in return for special — but usually exclusive — trading rights. For this reason VOC Admirals concluded a web of treaties with several Asian sovereigns during the first decades of the seventeenth century, but the Dutch were fully aware that not all sovereigns in the region required their “assistance”. Such treaties were usually concluded with kings and princes of smaller territories, and it was fully recognized even in Europe that the great kings of Asia — including the Emperor of China, and of course the King of Siam — were well in a position to hold their own. Thus, it becomes clear from the opening years of the seventeenth century, that European trade and influence in Southeast Asia ran on at least two major and politically distinct tracks.

As mentioned, one aspect of Dutch strategy of the early seventeenth century was also to win over and ally themselves with kings and princes in strategic locations throughout Southeast Asia. One of the best-known alliances was forged in 1603 between the King of Johor and Jakob van Heemskerk. In February the year, the Dutch Admiral captured with the assistance of his new Johorean allies a Portuguese carrack, the Santa Catarina, in what are now the Straits of Singapore and the Johor River estuary. The cargo was brought back to Europe and sold at a public auction where it yielded a sum that was truly staggering in its time. In the early phase of the VOC’s corporate life, freebooting arose as, and remained, a lucrative activity for the Dutch. The Straits of Singapore and the Johor River estuary quickly emerged as preferred spots from whence to prey on Portuguese merchant shipping.

The Lusitanian counterparts from Lisbon to Goa, Malacca and Macao were not complacent about their losses. After André Furtado de Mendonça assumed authority as Captain of Malacca, punitive expeditions were dispatched in the South China Sea’s monsoon season of 1603-4 and again in 1604-5, because Johor established and maintained friendly relations with Dutch “traders”. Simultaneously, the Portuguese armada stationed in the Johor River estuary anticipated the arrival of their merchant vessels inbound from Japan, China and Macassar, and lent them naval escort through the treacherous waters of the Singapore Straits to Malacca.

The seizure of the Santo António took place against the backdrop of heightened tension between the Dutch, Johoreans and the Portuguese over security in the Straits of Singapore and the Johor River estuary. It remains a hitherto largely neglected chapter that marks an important turning point in regional politics, diplomacy and trade. The Santo António incident provides an interesting snapshot that reveals much about the complexity and the fragility of political relations, the balance of power on the Malay Peninsula, as well as the flow and nature of intra-Asian trade in the early seventeenth century.

With special regard to issues surrounding regional politics and diplomacy, the Santo António incident specifically also marks an important shift in Patani’s relations with the Portuguese and paved the ground for improved relations with the Dutch. By turning its back on Lusitanian traders and the comparatively peaceful, if sometimes strained, relations with Portuguese Malacca, Patani hoped to reposition itself commercially, especially since the Dutch (unlike the Portuguese) had at the time no direct access point in the trade with China. Doubtless, the moves of both Patani as well as the VOC were carefully monitored by regional competitors, including specifically also the Johoreans (who were allies-in-arms with the

Dutch after 1603 and with whom Patani had a dynastic quarrel, Pahang and perhaps most important of all, the Siamese court in Ayutthaya. As is known, King Ekathosarot would soon dispatch Siam’s first ever diplomatic mission to the West, namely to Prince Maurice of Orange, the Stadholder of Holland and Zealand. This move was taken with considerable alarm by Philip III/II, the King of Spain and Portugal, but some years later the Siamese court actively sought to steer relations with Portugal on an improved diplomatic footing.

Furtado de Mendonça, Wijbrand van Warwijk and Dutch Freebooting in the Straits of Singapore

The seizure of the Santo Antônio took place in the immediate context escalating of violence in the Straits of Singapore and the Johor River estuary. The King of Johor, ‘Ala’udin Ri’ayat Shah III, had opened his territory to Dutch traders and lent active assistance to the seizure of the Santa Catarina in February 1603. André Furtado de Mendonça, a senior Portuguese officer and war hero, succeeded Fernão d’Albuquerque in September 1603 as Captain and Governor of Malacca. He used the opportunity of his new appointment to launch an offensive against Johor, on the diplomatic as well as strategic front. In October, 1603, Estêvão Teixeira de Made was dispatched with an armada to await the arrival of the Portuguese merchant fleet from Japan, Macao and Macassar within two and three months’ time, and to impose a blockade on the Johor River in retaliation for Johor’s earlier support of the Dutch during the Santa Catarina incident. Vice-Admiral Jakob Pietersz van Enkhuysen engaged Teixeira de Made’s armada on two separate occasions between October 6 and 11, 1603, and succeeded, to the evident relief of the Johor monarch and his orang kaya, in breaking the riverine blockade. But the success was short-lived. Just days after Pietersz departed with his ships for Patani, the remains of the Portuguese armada returned and closed off the river anew. In fact, Furtado de Mendonça attacked Batu Sawar in the early weeks of 1604, and demanded from the Johor monarch that he cut off contacts with the Dutch for good, expel VOC factors from his capital (and preferably hand them over to the Portuguese), as well as confiscate their assets. Of course the king did not oblige, and such heavy-handed diplomatic pressure only served to strengthen the resolve of the Johoreans against the Portuguese as well as their trading interests in the region.

In early May, 1604, three ships belonging to the fleet of Admiral Wijbrand van Warwijk, the Hollandia, Vlissingen and Sphaera Mundi, arrived in Johor waters and after a formal exchange of diplomatic gifts and niceties as well as ascertaining trade opportunities in the region, Van Warwijk set sail for Patani and China on 20 May, 1604. He later returned with the monsoon winds in December that year without having been able to conduct trade in China. Warwijk’s ships cast anchor off the coast of Tioman in early January 1605 where they laid in wait to prey on richly laden carracks from Japan, Macao, and Macassar.

The return of Van Warwijk to the Malay Peninsula marked in some symbolic way the beginning of Furtado de Mendonça’s annus horribilis in his position as Captain Major of Malacca. The year 1605 saw the Portuguese Estado da Índia in insular and peninsular Southeast Asia stretched to its limits, financially as well as militarily. The Dutch were stepping up their attacks on Portuguese fortifications in the Moluccas, and in February 1605, the fort Nossa Senhora da Anunciada on the island of Ambon was lost to the Northern European “intruders”. The serious problems experienced in the Moluccas may help explain why the first escort squadron — initially smaller than in the previous monsoon season — arrived later than usual in the waters of the Johor River estuary and the Straits of Singapore. Still, Portuguese naval presence did not deter Van Warwijk from stepping up Dutch freebooting activities in the waters around the Southern tip of the Malay Peninsula and the Riau Archipelago.
Vlissingen, belonging to the fleet of Van Warwijk, succeeded on January 14, 1605, in capturing a Portuguese vessel near Pedra Branca23 that was in-bound from Cochin China.24 The cargo seized by the crew of the Vlissingen included rice, textiles, angel-wood (174.5 picul or about 10,540 kilogrammes), Chinese camphor (two barrels of unspecified weight), benzoin (33.5 picul or about 2,023 kg) and six pieces of artillery.25 Further prizes followed. In the Straits of Singapore, Van Warwijk’s men also took one of Furtado de Mendonça’ junks that was loaded with provisions for Malacca. Some weeks later, in June 1605, the Dutch also seized a smaller craft arriving from the island of Solor that was carrying a precious cargo of sandalwood (92 bahar or about 16,670 kg) and sea-turtle shell (karet, toetroego).26

Anticipating Dutch attacks in the Johor River estuary, the Portuguese authorities in Malacca mustered all available naval support and in late February dispatched an armada through the Singapore Straits under the personal command of Furtado de Mendonça. This fleet consisted of seven galleons, thirty bantins, twenty foists27 and ten Javanese champans.28 The seasoned Lusitanian admiral’s presence was more than just proverbial sabre-rattling or early-modern gunboat diplomacy. As in the previous year, the Portuguese undertook an extended military campaign against Johor (albeit not as powerful as the campaign of Dom Paulo de Lima Pereira in 1588)29 and laid siege to the capital Batu Sawar.30 This royal residence and capital city, which was also known as “New Johor”, was situated on the upper reaches of the Johor River some twelve Portuguese legoaos or about thirty-six kilometres from the sea.31 Documentary evidence suggests that Furtado de Mendonça was very confident of his imminent victory over Johor, and issued written threats to the King. The Admiral boasted that, should this military enterprise fail, he and the residents of Malacca would gladly pay tribute to the King of Johor. This was a clear act of hubris committed in the heat of confrontation. While one cannot possibly claim that Furtado actually lost the military campaign, he certainly did not succeed in his enterprise either. After wasting much scarce gunpowder and ammunition, and suffering many casualties, the Portuguese abandoned the siege on Batu Sawar. The Johor capital was protected by palisades and well-provisioned and Furtado not only lost time, men and opportunities, he also lost a good deal of credibility and prestige, and he certainly never paid a single pardao in tribute. And while the Portuguese armada was busy pursuing their futile siege in the upper reaches of the Johor River, Van Warwijk’s ships scoured the waters in the open sea around Tioman and Pedra Branca, hoping to spot and attack easy Portuguese merchant prey.

The Seizure of the Santo António at Patani

In January 1605 a carrack by the name of Santo António set sail from Macao for Malacca and Goa. It was undertaking the voyage together with a second vessel, belonging to João Caiado de Gambôa, that had departed the Portuguese-controlled port of Hirado in November, 1604, and was reportedly “richly laden” with silver from Japan.32 This silver was in payment for the substantial cargo of silks sold in Japan that year, and this not only brought in “very fat profits” (muy grossos ganhos) for 1604, it also wiped out much of the debt left behind from the earlier loss of the Santa Catarina to Jakob van Heemskerck.33 For their voyage through the dangerous and pirate-infested waters of the South China Sea, as well as the Straits of Singapore and Malacca, the two merchant vessels were under armed escort of a galleon (galeão de combião) belonging to the Crown of Portugal.34

According to extant reports of both Portuguese and Dutch origin, the merchant fleet experienced stormy weather in the course of which the Santo António lost its helm on course to Pedra Branca at the Eastern entrance to the Straits of Singapore.35 Given that the ship was damaged and difficult to manoeuvre, and most certainly could not pass through the treacherous
Strait, she sailed on 17 February, 1605, into the port of Patani, in the Gulf of Siam.36 The other vessels of the merchant fleet, including Caia do Gambôa’s silver ship from Japan and the Royal Portuguese galleon continued their onward journey to Malacca, where they arrived safely. But the Santo António was left behind in Patani for repairs.37

At the turn of the seventeenth century, Patani was ruled by a queen, Raja Hijau.38 The port represented an important node in the regional trading networks that linked Siam, Pegu, Borneo, the Malay Peninsula and China.39 Patani was also on nominally peaceful terms with the Estado da India. For this reason, the Santo António’s call at the port and payment of fees should have not given rise to any exceptional concerns for the security of the ship and its cargo, estimated in official Portuguese reports at around 80,000 Cruzados at cost.40 The bulk of this, appraised at 50,000 Cruzados, was earmarked for transhipment to the final destination at Goa.41

The crew of the Santo António was almost certainly aware that the Dutch maintained a factory in Patani, and also that their trading ships earlier visited the port. But the political climate, normally favourably disposed toward the Portuguese merchants, was changing rapidly before their very eyes.

Claes Simons Meelbael had taken over from his predecessor Van der Leck as head of the VOC factory in Patani. The Dutch factor reportedly placed considerable pressure on Raja Hijau of Patani and her councillors (the so-called menteri or mantri) to consent to their seizure of the Portuguese carrack Santo António and its cargo.42 With the benefit of hindsight one can say that this diplomatic move paid off, and the Queen yielded to Dutch agitation and ultimately agreed to “share” the booty equally.43

By March 25, 1605, Admiral Van Warwijk was still stationed with his fleet off the coast of Tioman, hoping to waylay Portuguese vessels in-bound from China. On this day he received news that Raja Hijau had consented to a Dutch seizure of a vessel anchored in her port on the Patani river. Van Warwijk did not hesitate a moment longer. He gave instructions to set course for Patani, where he arrived on March 26, 1605. His ship moved close by the ill-fated Santo António and cast anchor.

The crew of the Portuguese carrack was well aware of its impending fate, and pledged to defend ship and cargo to the last drop of blood. That very same evening, the Santo António’s mates were ferried to shore,44 leaving the carrack and its cargo in Dutch hands. The ship was taken, unceremoniously, without one casualty or a single shot fired.45

One should perhaps more accurately state “remaining cargo”, for reports have it that the most valuable part of the Santo António’s load had been earlier transferred to shore and brought via the land path across the Isthmus of Kra and through the territory of Kedah to Malacca and “other” unidentified places on the Peninsula. The portion of the Santo António’s cargo that escaped Dutch seizure included 700 to 800 picul (approximately 42,350-48,400 kilogrammes) of raw silk, about 200 bales of silks and some three bahar (which is equivalent to about nine picul or about 544 kilogrammes) in gold.46 It can thus scarcely surprise — and the Dutch source bitterly complains about this — that the value of the cargo seized from the Santo António was significantly less than if it had been captured, for example, on open sea.

Nevertheless, what remained in the hull still made this rather effortless catch financially worth while. The Dutch “traders” made prize of the following items:47 2,000 picul (approximately 121,000 kilogrammes) of white powdered sugar, baskets of sugar candy (stok-zuiker), 4,500 picul (approximately 272,000 kilogrammes) of tintinago or spelter,48 223 fardels of Chinese camphor, 18 lead boxes of musk-balls, 11 chests of vermillion,50 22 chests containing Chinese fans (Chinese waejers), 209 fardels of raw silk, and 75 fardels of “bad yellow raw silk” (geele slegte ruwe zyde), 6,000 pieces of coloured (bont) sundry porcelain as well as 10 casks of both coarse and fine porcelain. Other items among the cargo included radix Chiniae,51 taffetas, damask,52 gold.
thread, wooden boxes or chests, benzoin and other objects made in China that are not listed in detail. At Patani, Van Warwijk further organized the purchase of 430 *picul* (approximately 26,000 kilogrammes) of raw silk for a total value of about 49,500 *Pesos de a ocho* (“Ryals-of-Eight” or “Pieces of Eight”, approximately 123,750 Guilders) and another 3,000 *Pesos* (approximately 7,500 Guilders) worth of *gewrochte zijde*, which is a form of raw silk. It is generally believed that the goods bought here in Patani originally stemmed from the cargo of the *Santo António*, and possibly had been impounded by the authorities in the city of Patani, or sold by the Portuguese to raise money for repairs on the ailing vessel.

**Diplomatic and Commercial Repercussions of the *Santo António* Incident**

It transpires from a series of primary sources, including the autobiography of Jacques de Coutre, that relations between Patani and the Portuguese had been strained since the assassination of António de Saldanha, a *casado* of Malacca, at Patani and the establishment of a Dutch factory there in 1602. The seizure of the *Santo António* marked the symbolic rupture of friendly, if occasionally strained, relations of Patani’s monarch with the Portuguese. As a result of Dutch pressure and one might also add greed, Patani had now turned its back on the Lusitanian merchants, and once the seizure was committed, fear began to permeate the Patani court and the circle of Dutch “traders” over possible retaliation from Furtado de Mendonça. Retaliate they did. An anonymous report written in 1605 holds out the possibility that Furtado de Mendonça deploy part of his *armada* from Johor to Patani in order to save face. The author is (perhaps deliberately) unsure whether the carrack was still in the port of Patani, and therefore, salvagable. The Malacca authorities detained and impounded a junk belonging to the Patani merchant Radzia Caltana and confiscated its cargo. Also, on 3 April, 1605, “the Japanese” set fire to warehouses that destroyed a good portion of the silk stock, estimated by Heert Terpstra at 200 *picul*. The journal of Van Warwijk’s voyage printed in Isaac Commelin’s *Begin ende Voortgang van de Vereenighe Nederlantsche Geocctroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (Beginning and Continuation of the United Dutch East India Company) is not clear as to who these Japanese culprits really were. Terpstra underscores that they were “mercenaries” in the employ of the Lusitanian crown. He opines that this act of revenge made things worse for the Portuguese since the mercenaries set fire, not to the cargo seized by the Dutch, but the silk supposedly impounded or confiscated by Raja Hijau.

Between the court officials at Patani and the Dutch traders there followed a good deal of wrangling and haggling over “damages” suffered by the Patanese and the indemnity that the Dutch needed to pay. Eventually, Van Warwijk and his men paid a fee of 12,000 *Pesos* together with “some gifts” to various parties. They also reimbursed Radzia Caltana the sum of 2,640 *Pesos* for the loss of his junk and cargo. The Dutch, too, feared some form of retaliation for their hostile act, and had carpenters work on the *Santo António* to make modifications and repairs. On the basis of Portuguese sources consulted, it is evident that the fear was mutual. Losses to Portuguese merchant shipping in 1605 alone were the largest ever, and Furtado de Mendonça lamented that there was no end in sight to these intolerable conditions. No doubt the Portuguese had their ears tuned to any suspicious developments in the region, and would have heard from their sympathisers of Johorean plans to launch a joint attack with the Dutch on Malacca. They were expecting the worst, and by the closing months of 1605, efforts were already well under way to upgrade the fortifications in Malacca and prepare for a future siege. Also, at substantial cost one is informed, an *armada* was dispatched from India and set sail from Goa on May 13, 1606. These moves probably saved Malacca from falling to the
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Dutch when, in 1606, Matelieff de Jonghe arrived with his fleet from the Netherlands and laid siege to the city.63 This vigilance was also extended to Malacca’s trading interests in the region. The Portuguese scholar Paulo de Sousa Pinto reports in his recently-published work, Portugueses e Malaios, Malaca e os Sultanatos de Jor e Achém that from early 1606, (that is from the beginning of the next trading season with China following the Santo António incident), the Malaccan officials stepped up the patrolling of waters around the Peninsula to protect in-bound vessels from Macao.64 Heightened security efforts certainly focussed on freebooting hotspots, such as notably the Straits of Singapore and the sea between Pedra Branca and Tioman.

Despite these efforts at protecting in-bound merchant shipping from China and Japan, business sentiment in Malacca soured by the opening weeks of 1606. According to a letter dating from February 1606 and cited by Paul Anton Tiele,65 “A Malay merchant from Palembang who made a voyage to Malacca reported that there were only a “few or no soldiers” stationed in the city, but that “more than two hundred of them” were dispatched to the Johor River, no doubt, anticipating the arrival of ships from China and Macassar. The same merchant also highlighted that the casados of Malacca risked not going to sea, fearing the wrath of the freebooters, whom he identified as the ingresen (English). Perhaps he confused them with the Dutch or simply could not keep the two apart. But the business mood was reportedly so depressed that foreign merchants were leaving town, and the casados of Malacca were not engaging in trade, but trying to eke out a living from farming.

Return to Europe and sale of the Santo António’s cargo

After several months in Patani, the Santo António was dispatched on 15 September, 1605, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sebastiaanse to the Johor River. He was to ascertain whether a cargo of pepper could be procured there.66 Van Warwijk himself remained behind in Patani for a few more weeks, winding up business there, and appointing Ferdinand Miechels as the new head of the VOC factory at Patani. He set sail with the Hollandia and arrived on 12 November, 1605, at the mouth of the Johor River. At Batu Sawar, Van Warwijk and Sebastiaanse treated with the Johor monarch and also with the King’s powerful half-brother, Raja Bongsu. The monarch exhorted the Dutch party to join him in an attack on Portuguese Malacca.67 But Van Warwijk and Sebastiaanse evidently felt that with their ships already laden with goods, the stakes were too high. To the disappointment of the Johor royals, the Dutch “traders” declined.

From Johor Van Warwijk proceeded on December 12 with the ship Vlissingen to Bantam. Cornelis Bastianzoon, his ship Amsterdam, as well as the Santo António followed a day or two later. All had reached their destination by December 27, 1605. After completing some business in Java, and inspecting the seaworthiness and comfort of the captured Portuguese carrack for the long voyage home, Van Warwijk and his men hoisted anchor on January 6, 1606, and set sail for Europe.68

The further course of events is reconstructed only with difficulty, but it clearly transpires that the original cargo of the Santo António was distributed among several other vessels of Van Warwijk’s fleet and brought back to Europe. From a letter by Bantam’s oppercoopman (chief purveyor) Jacques l’Hermite to the directors of the VOC in Amsterdam dated January 28, 1608, it transpires that the Santo António began to leak seriously and had to be abandoned. It’s precious cargo was brought onto a “little island” near the Bay of Antogil on the northeastern coast of Madagascar. Jan Fransz, the Dutch captain of the Santo António, returned to Bantam with a cutter and arrived in West Java on November 17, 1607. Here he explored the possibility of sending a ship to Madagascar to load the salvaged cargo and complete its journey to Europe. Initially, the VOC officials at Bantam toyed with the idea of dispatching the

Grote Sonne which was at anchor taking on provisions, but the needs of the Dutch military positions in Ternate proved more pressing. On December 3 the Grote Sonne set sail for Grissée (Gresik) and Macassar where she was to procure additional provisions of beans and rice before setting course for the Moluccas. Luck would have it that the 700-ton Mauritius arrived from the port of Patani shortly thereafter with only little cargo in its hold. The ship was quickly provisioned, and on December 27, 1607, set sail for Grissée (Gresik) and Macassar where she was to procure additional provisions of beans and rice before setting course for the Moluccas.70 On 28 April, 1608, she cast anchor in the Bay of St. Augustine on the Southwestern coast of Madagascar. The crew unloaded the cargo and made substantial repairs to the ship. The Mauritius set sail again on 27 October, 1608, and rounded the Cape of Good Hope on 1 February, 1609, and visited the Congo River Estuary on 19 March. Off the Coast of Guinea, near Cabo Lope Gonsalves, the Mauritius literally fell apart. The crew dispatched a sloop to the Gold Coast and purchased a vessel there that would be capable of transporting the surviving cargo to the Netherlands. On 6 August, 1609, the Amsterdam directors of the VOC expressed their grave concern to the Grand Pensionary (Landsadvocaat) and leading statesman, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, that they had as yet heard nothing about the Mauritius which had sailed from Bantam to Madagascar to salvage the cargo of the Santo António. To the Vlissingen was also transferred a chest (kist) comprising ten “lead containers” of musk cods weighing a total of 102 pounds. The provenance of this precious commodity can also be traced back to the ill-fated Portuguese carrack.73

Van Warwijk and his officers resolved to split the fleet. The three ships Amsterdam, Zeelandia and Vlissingen would proceed with their homeward journey on 21 April, 1606, while the cargo of the ailing Hollandia and Dordrecht would remain behind, brought ashore and sheltered in facilities built for this purpose. These two latter ships were repaired and set sail on 4 November, 1606 and after a sojourn on the island of St. Helena in the Southern Atlantic arrived at the homeports in Zealand and Holland in June 1607.

Although the Vlissingen had been leaking, it managed to return in the company of the Amsterdam and Zeelandia to its homeport on the Isle of Walcheren in Zealand as early as 13 October, 1606.74 According to the excellent study of Victor Enthoven, the sale of this
specific portion of the Santo Anteónio’s cargo yielded gross receipts of £2,050 Flemish or 12,300 Guilders. After deducting £50 for expenses, £400 in tax were ceded to the local Admiralty Board, being the so-called gerechtigheid van het land, (this was fixed at the rate of 20%) and £66 (or 1/30 of net proceeds) to the Stadholder, Prince Maurice of Orange. The mates and officers of the Vlissingen further received £61 (366 Guilders). This sum represented 4% of the net proceeds and was considerably less than the portion of 6.3% customarily allocated to the crew of merchant vessels. In addition to these £61 Flemish, the crew of the Vlissingen later received a lump sum of £250 Flemish (1,500 Guilders) to distribute among themselves. This latter sum was subdivided into 92 1/4 paeyen or parts equivalent to £21:13:4 1/2 Flemish (14:4:15 Guilders) and distributed among the surviving crew of the Vlissingen according to their rank and function. Admiral Van Warwijk received a sum equivalent to eight paeyen or £21:13:4, the skipper and coopman (merchant, purser) on each 6 paeyen or £16:4:15 and the ship’s boys, the lowest ranking men on board, the equivalent of 1/2 paey or £1:7: 3/4 Flemish.

In their pessimistic letter to Oldenbarnevelt dated 11 September, 1609, the Amsterdam directors were perhaps too narrowly focused on the fate of the Mauritius and not looking at the broader picture. According to Pieter van Dam’s monumental Beschrijvinge van de Oost-Indische Compagnie (Description of the [Dutch] East India Company), the levy (the so-called gerechtigheid van het land) charged by the Admiralty Boards on goods seized in acts of freebooting, amounted to 317,000 Guilders or about £53,000 Flemish from the cargo of the Santo António alone. As the rate was fixed at about 20 per cent of total proceeds, this means that the sale of the Santo António’s cargo (and that might have also included the silks purchased from the Queen of Patani that are thought to have been impounded from the carrack) raised about 1.6 million Guilders, which translates into approximately into £265,000 Flemish, 565,000 Portuguese Cruzados or 650,000 Pesos. Given the cargo’s value at cost had been originally appraised at 80,000 Cruzados, and that the “more valuable part” of the goods had “escaped overland” to Malacca, the theoretical gross profit margin was several hundred percent. In any case, total proceeds were at that time roughly equal to one quarter of the VOC’s original capital base of 1602.

It should be emphasized that the Santo António’s cargo was the second most valuable single prize taken by the VOC and its commercial predecessor from a Portuguese merchant ship at the time, exceeded only by the cargo of the ill-fated Portuguese carrack, Santa Catarina. The proceeds from the Santo António were greater than from the cargo of the São Jorge (sometimes referred to in extant literature as the St. Jago) a Portuguese vessel captured earlier en route from Goa to Lisbon. But this is not quite the end of the story. The cargo from the other vessels seized by Van Warwijk in 1605 around the Straits of Singapore and also by Admiral Steven van der Hagen, the Dutch hero of the Moluccas, brought additional revenues of 133,000 Guilders to the Admiralty Boards. This reflects theoretical gross receipts of 665,000 Guilders, being approximately £110,000 Flemish, 238,000 Cruzados or 266,000 Pesos from the sale of the abovementioned cargos.

As Pieter van Dam wrote in his voluminous history of the Dutch East India Company, “It was found that Chinese goods, especially silk, could be sold in large quantities here and certainly yielded the most profits. All of the “undamaged silk” of the two carracks seized from the Portuguese [i.e. the Santa Catarina and the Santo António] could be sold, far exceeding the profits from the sale of spices.” This was, indeed, the new pattern of trade that would be sustained well into the eighteenth century.
Notes

1 At the time of completing this article, the author was attached to the Institut für Ostasienkunde of the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Abteilung Sinologie, under an existing agreement with the National University of Singapore. He would like to extend his special thanks to the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in München, Cambridge University Library, and the Algemeen Rijksarchief in The Hague for granting access to their specialist collections, rare books, and manuscripts.

2 The most celebrated theoretical defence of the Portuguese Empire was undertaken by Seraphim de Freitas in his De Justo Imperio Asiatico, written in the second decade of the seventeenth century, but published at Valladolid, Spain, in 1625. There are no extant English translations of this important work at hand, but translations into German, French and Portuguese are available. Cf. Seraphim de Freitas: Über die Rechtmässige Herrschaft der Portugiesen in Asien, translated and introduced by Jörg P. Hardegen, Inauguraldissertation, Kiel, 1976; Justification de la Domination Portugaise en Asie, translated and introduced by A. Guichon de Grandpont, Paris: J. P. Aillaud Guillard & Cie, 1882; Do justo império asiático dos portugueses. De justo imperio Lustitanorum asiatico, introduced by Macello Caetano and translated by Miguel Pinto de Meneses (Latin and Portuguese text) 2 vols., Lisbon: 1959.

3 Translations of both of these epoch-making treaties can be found in: The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898, edited by Emma H. Blair and James A. Robertson, 55 vols., Cleveland: A. H. Clark Co., 1903-1909, cf. specifically vol. 1, pp. 115ff and ibid., pp. 222ff..

4 Many of these treaties have been reproduced in the Corpus Diplomaticum Neêrlando-Indicum. It should be stressed, however, that the Dutch were not alone in forging these legally-secured alliances and relations of trade. Portugal, too, secured its rights by treaty, many of which contain, after the beginning of the seventeenth century, “anti-Dutch” clauses, i.e. provisions that specifically mention the Dutch for exclusion in trade and formal diplomatic relations. Concerning the Portuguese treaty-system, cf. particularly the documents contained in: Julio Firminio Judice Biker, Collecção de tratados e concertos de pazes que o Estado da Índia Portugueza fez com os reis e senhores com quem teve relações nas partes da Ásia e Africa Oriente, desde o principio da conquista até ao fin do século XVIII, 10 vols., Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1881-1887; as well as the recent award-winning study: António Vasconcelos de Saldanha: Iustum Imperium, dos tratados como fundamento o império dos portugueses no Oriente: estudo de história do direito internacional e do direito português, Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 1997.


for assisting the rebels [i.e. the Dutch] in taking the carrack from China [i.e. probably the Santa Catarina]; cf. also the letter of the King of Portugal to his Viceroy of India, dat. Valladolid, 27 December, 1604, document 14, ibid., pp. 287-289 passim.


10 Ernst Netscher, De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak, Batavia: Bruining & Wijt, 1870, letter of the King of Johor dated 6 February, 1609, pp. 17ff., esp. pp. 19-20 where the origin of the dynastic quarrel is explained by the monarch in some detail.


13 Documentos Remetidos da Índia esp. vol. IV, doc. 933, letter of the King to his Viceroy of India, dated 17 January, 1618, pp. 260-261.


17 Emanuel van Meteren, Historiën der Nederlanden en haar Naburen Oorlogen tot het jaar 1612, Amsterdam: Ian Iacobsz Schipper, 1652, fol. 518 recto.


19 An indication of this incident is provided in Meteren (1652) fol. 518 recto, “Dese Schepen brochten tijdinge mede dat de Portugesen sterk met Schepen ende Galeyen in de Riviere van Yor waren, om den Koningh van Yor te dwinghen, wesende seer op hem gestoort, hem beschuldighende dat hy d’oorsaecke was van’t nemen van de Caracque S. Catharina, hebbende hem gedreyght met geduerige Oorloge, ten ware hy hun de Nederlanders wilde over-leveren met haer goederen, etc.”


21 Meteren (1652) fol. 518 recto.


23 Literally “white rock”, protruding from the sea at the Eastern entrance to the present-day Straits of Singapore.

24 “Historische Verhael” in: Commelin, Begin ende Voortgang, vol. II (1646) p. 82.


- One picul is equivalent to approximately 60.4 kg.


27 Small sailing boat that can also be rowed.


30 Pinto (1997) pp. 120-121.


39 Cf. also Meteren (1652) fol. 550 verso

40 Mendes da Luz (1952) p. 266, simply states that the carrack was “ricamente caregada” or “richly laden”.


42 Mendes da Luz (1952) p. 266 states that the ship was taken in the bay (na baía) of Patani.

43 Meteren (1652) fol. 518, “… de Coniniginne van Patana seyde, dat sy niet vermochten sulcks [i.e. seize the Portuguese carrack] op haren stroom te doen: dies accordeerense de helft met haer te deylen. ...”.

44 Meteren (1652) fol. 518 recto, claims that the Portuguese mates abandoned ship (... daer van’t Volk vlucht...).

The Seizure of the Santo António at Patani.
VOC Freebooting, the Estado da Índia and Peninsular Politics, 1602-1609

The Seizure of the Santo António at Patani.
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48 Pieter van Dam, Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, edited by F. W. Stapel, book 1, part 2, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1929, pp. 702, in the glossary under the term “tintemago, tutanego”; Henry Yule and A.C. Burnell: Hobson-Jobson. A Glossary of Colloquial Anglo Indian Words and Phrases, Sittingbourne: Linguasia, 1994, pp. 932-933, “tootnague”. This zinc-based metal from China was used for a variety of purposes including ship’s ballast, the minting of coins, as well as for the casting of cannon balls and bullets.

49 This term is derived from the Italian word fardello which means “bundle” or “pack”.

50 Vermilion is a sulphur-mercury compound that is found naturally, or was already synthetically produced in China during the early-modern period.

51 Also known as China-root, China-wood, tuber Chnae, and Smilax China, this pharmacological substance had a variety of uses, including the treatment of gout and the whitening of skin. Cf. Hobson-Jobson (1994) p. 199.

52 Taffettas and damask are forms of woven silk.

53 This cargo list, in fact, represents what could be deemed a standard or conventional load for its day. Compare it with the list of marketable goods listed by Morga in his discussion on Manila’s trade with the Chinese merchants: António de Morga, The Philippine Islands, Moluccas, Siam Cambodia, Japan and China at the Close of the Sixteenth Century, edited by L. V. de Torres and H. E. J. Stanley, London: Hakluyt Society, 1868, pp. 305-306.

54 “Historische Verhæl” in: Commelin, Begin ende Voortgang, vol. II (1646), p. 82; Meteren (1652), fol. 518 recto. Additional purchases of Chinese silks were also made in Bantam.


56 Terpstra (1938) p. 25.

57 Mendes da Luz (1952) document XXIX, “Relação do estado em que estavam ais coisas da Índia no ano de 1605”, p. 431.

58 For the full details of the source, cf. above, note 18. - A translation of this important work into French and English are as: René Augustin Constantin de Renneville: Recueil des voyages qui ont servi à l’établissement & aux progrès de la Compagnie des Indes Orientales, formée dans les Provinces-Unies des Païs-Bas, Amsterdam: J. F. Bernard, 1725; A collection of voyages undertaken by the Dutch East-India Company, for the Improvement of Trade and Navigation, Containing an account of several Attempts to find out the North-East Passage, and other Discoveries in the East-Indies and the South Sea, London: no publisher, 1703.

59 “Historische Verhæl” in: Commelin, Begin ende Voortgang, vol. II (1646) p. 82.

60 Meteren (1652) fol. 518 recto, “... begonden dat Schip [i.e. the Santo António] wat lagher te timmeren...”: Terpstra (1938) p.25.

61 Tiele (1883) p. 239.


64 Pinto, Portugueses e Malaios. (1997) p. 197.

65 Tiele (1883) p. 229, note 2.


69 De Jonge, Opkomst, III (1865) pp. 245-246.
70 Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the 17th and 18th Centuries, vol. III (Homebound Voyages), pp. 12-13, entry 0098.
72 Ibid., no. 248, De Bewindhebbers van de Oostindische Compagnie te Amsterdam aan Oldenbarnevelt, 11 September, 1609, pp. 343-344.
74 Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the 17th and 18th Centuries, vol. III (Homebound Voyages) pp. 12-13, entries 0068, 0082 and 0093.
76 Ibid., p. 209 note 238.
77 Ibid., p. 208.
78 Ibid., p. 209.
79 Van Dam (1929) p. 499.
80 Cf. above, note 41.
82 Cf. above, note 41.
83 Meteren (1652) fol. 450 recto.
84 Van Dam (1929) pp. 499, 517.
85 Ibid., p. 672.
86 A similar statement is made by Emanuel van Meteren in his Historiën der Nederlanden for the year 1606, highlighting that raw silk was brought back by Dutch ships in plenty, and that it was also highly desired by the people in the Low Countries. Cf. Meteren (1652) fol. 518 recto.
87 I.e. silk that had not suffered damage from salt water, etc., en route to Europe.