RED, BLACK, YELLOW
AND STRIPED BANNERS

The Siamese Military
Expedition to Laos and
Sipsongchuthai of 1884-85

During the last half of the nineteenth century, between approximately 1865 and 1890, large areas of northern Laos and western Tonkin were ravaged by bands of invading Chinese soldiers known as “Flag Gangs” or, to Lao and Thai historiography, as “Haw” (in Royal Institute transliteration, Ho) bandits. These outlaws and freebooters, fleeing the suppression of internal rebellion and reenforcement of imperial authority which accompanied the T'ung-chih Restoration (1862-74), first entered Tonkin in 1865, when bands of “Black Flags” and rival “Yellow Flags”, fleeing the resurgent armies of the Ch'ing, crossed the Sino-Vietnamese frontier and set up bases in the upper reaches of the Song Koi (Red River) Valley.1

Over the next twenty years the “Black Flags” and their renowned leader, Liu Yung-fu (better known to the Vietnamese as Luu-Vinh-Phuc), were to acquire legitimacy and fame in the service both of the Vietnamese monarch, Tu'-Du'. and of the latter’s Ch'ing suzerains, in their struggle against French imperialism in Tonkin. By contrast the “Yellow Flags”, under the leadership of Huang Ch'ung-ying (better known to the Vietnamese as Hoang-Sung-Anh and to the Thais and Laotians as Puang Nansi) failed to acquire this legitimacy and, pursued by a combination of Vietnamese, “Black Flag” and Ch'ing forces, were broken up and defeated. In 1875-76, following the capture and execution of Huang Ch'ung-ying by Ch'ing-Nguyen coalition forces, the surviving “Yellow Flag” remnants fled westwards, into the upper reaches of the Song Bo’ (Black River) Valley, whence they harassed the various mu'ang of the semi-independent Tai-speaking federation of Sipsongchuthai, an area ruled by an hereditary “White Thai” prince, the Chao Lai, from his capital at mui 'ang Lai (the modern Lai Chau). Faced with this threat Kham Sinh, the Chao Lai, appealed for assistance to Liu Yung-fu, the “Black Flag” leader, who responded by sending a powerful band of his followers to Son La, which had been occupied by a force of 3,000 “Yellow Flag” formerly owing allegiance to Huang Ch'ung-ying. The greater part of these “Yellow Flag” forces accepted Liu Yung-fu's offer of an amnesty, and travelled back to the latter’s base at Lao Cai to swell the ranks of his forces. One band of “Yellow Flags”, under the leadership of Kwan-kok-tai, refused to surrender, however, and fled westwards across the present day Vietnamese-Laotian frontier into the Lao provinces of Phuan (Siangkhwang) and Huaphanhatanghok (Huaphan, Samnu'a). They were pursued by a tenacious band of Liu Yung-fu’s “Black Flags”, under the
leadership of Ong-ba, which subsequently settled at Tha Khwa in the Song Bo’ Valley. In this way bands of outlawed “Yellow Flags” and legitimised “Black Flags” (in the service of Kham Sinh, the Chao Lai, and thence to Liu Yung-fu and his masters) came to Sipsongchuthai and eastern Laos.

Meanwhile, further to the north-west, from about 1872 onwards bands of defeated rebels and freebooters fleeing the Ch'ing reconquest of Yunnan also began to stream southwards across the frontier into Laos. These new bands, distinguished by “Red Flag” (Th. Thong Daeng) and “Striped Flag” (Th. Thong Lai) banners, moved southwards to occupy large tracts of eastern Laos and Sipsongchuthai, with “Red Flags” sacking Mü’ ang Thaeng (Dien Bien Phu) and advancing into Huaphanhatanghok in 1873, and “Striped Flag” and “Yellow Flag” forces seizing control of most of Phuan in the same year.

Faced with this “Flag Gang” challenge, in 1874 Chao Unkham, the ruler of Luang Phrabang, and the Nguyen monarch Tu’- Du’c, sent a joint army to expel the invaders; this force, however, was routed, and Chao Ung. Lord of Phuan, was killed. The victorious “Flag Gangs” moved south to sack Viangchan (Vientiane), whilst Chao Unkham of Luang Phrabang sent urgent appeals for assistance to his Bangkok suzerain, King Chulalongkorn of Siam.

Accordingly, in the Spring of 1875, Siamese forces crossed the Maekhong at Nongkhai and, in the First Siamese Military Expedition of the late nineteenth century “Haw Wars” (Songkhram Ho), advanced to seize the main Chinese base at Thung Chiangkham. The expedition failed to achieve its primary objective, however, in that the “Flag Gangs” withdrew into the mountain fastnesses of Phuan and Huaphanhatanghok, refusing to give battle. Thus, when the Siamese forces withdrew from Laos later in 1875, the status quo ante was restored, with armed Haw bands continuing to loot and plunder the Laos-Tonkin borderlands more or less at will.

Eight years later, in 1883, faced with a renewed Haw threat to his capital at Luang Phrabang, Chao Unkham again appealed to King Chulalongkorn for assistance. The present paper, which is part of a larger overall study of the “Haw Wars” in Laos and Tonkin, is concerned with Chulalongkorn’s response and the Siamese Military Expedition to Laos and Sipsongchuthai of 1884-85.

As we have seen, following the first Siamese Military Expedition to Laos in 1875 and the approximately concurrent suppression of Huang Ch’un-ying and his “Yellow Flags” by combined Ch’ing, Vietnamese and “Black Flag” forces, the various groups of illicit “Flag Bandits” operating in the Laos-Tonkin borderlands—that is, the “Red Flags”, “Striped Flags” and surviving “Yellow Flags” in contradistinction to Liu Yung-fu’s legitimised “Black Flags”—were driven back by pressures from both east and west into the largely unadministered upland regions of Sipsongchuthai and Huaphanhatanghok. Little or no information is available concerning the activities of the various “Flag Gang” factions in these marginal areas during the period 1880-1884,2
but it may be assumed that, chastened by the Siamese and Ch'ing response to their excursions into the fertile lowland valleys of the Maekhong and Song Koi, the "Flag Gangs" bandits limited their exactions during this period to the unfortunate inhabitants of these remote upland regions whilst—in common with the courts of Hue, Peking and Bangkok—they watched with increasing concern the advance of French arms in Annam and Tonkin.

By the time of the final French conquest of Tonkin in 1884-85, therefore, the situation of the Laos-Tonkin borderlands remained essentially unchanged. Thus, as in 1880, a group of pacified "Black Flags" under the leadership of Ong Ba and allied to the Chao Lai, Kham Sinh, remained settled at Tha Khwa on the middle reaches of the Song Bo, whilst further to the west various groups of "Red", "Striped" and "Yellow" banners held sway over the marginal territories between Mi'ang Lai and Luang Phrabang. Of these latter groups the most important were bands of "Yellow Flags" at Bandai and Bannapa (in the vicinity of Sop-aet) under Kwan-ko-yi; a larger and possibly allied group of "Yellow Flags" stationed in the Son La region under the leadership of "Puang Nansi's henchman... Yip-man-tai"; and numbers of "Flag Bandits" of indeterminate allegiance (but including both "Red Flag" and "Striped Flag" elements) further to the south, in and around the old Haw stronghold at Thung Chiangkham. Meanwhile, in a separate but related theatre well to the north-west, Lunag Phrabang remained threatened by Kwan-ko-tai and his followers (identified by Viravong as "Striped Flags") from their base in the vicinity Ban Huai Sai.

Accordingly, in 1883, in an attempt to pre-empt this resurgent "Flag Gangs" threat to the Maekhong Valley, Chao Unkham of Luang Phrabang ordered two small contingents of Lao troops to advance north-eastwards up the parallel valleys of the Nam U and the Nam Suong in a move designed to stem the slow but sure extension of Haw power towards his capital. At the same time, in response to an appeal from his vassal Chao Unkham, King Chulalongkorn gave orders for the despatch of a further Siamese military expedition against the Haw. Perhaps because the strength of the Haw bands menacing Luang Phrabang was underestimated, however, no punitive force was sent from Bangkok instead, in response to limited Haw advances resulting in the sack of Mi'ang You, Mi'ang Ngan and Mi'ang Thatom, provincial levies were raised by Phraya Phichai and Phraya Rajchaworanukul (Wek Bunrattaphan, generally known as "Phraya Raj") during the latter months of 1884. These forces—who were essentially "regional", being of predominantly North Thai and North-eastern Thai (ethnic Lao) origin—were to be employed in the second Siamese military expeditions of the Haw Wars, the objective of which was the expulsion of the "Flag Gangs" from their strongholds in Phuan and Huapannahatangkhok during the winter of 1884-85.

The resulting expedition, in which the surveyor James McCarthy and a number of other Europeans participated, was ill-conceived, inadequately planned,
and ultimately unsuccessful. Because of McCarthy’s presence the 1884-85 Expedition is particularly well-documented, however, and the personal accounts of this indefatigable British servant of King Chulalongkorn collectively provide images of the endeavour, suffering and incompetence surrounding the Haw Wars which are perhaps clearer, and certainly more evocative, than those to be found in official Siamese Government accounts of the same period.

McCarthy had begun his acquaintance with the Laos-Tongkin borderlands in the first months of 1884, when he led a surveying expedition to Phuan and the southern frontiers of Huaphanhatanghok. During this journey he travelled widely through territories subject to regular attack by the various “Flag Gangs”, and notes that ‘as we went on, tales of the Haw were brought in, agonizing accounts of their raiding on villages, whose inhabitants they had slaughtered, mutilated, or carried into captivity’. McCarthy was greatly impressed by the beauty and natural wealth of the regions he traverse, but found the inhabitants living a ‘wretched existence... harried, mutilated and slaughtered by robbers (whilst at the same time complaining of) the oppression and extortion practised by their own governor’ Čhao Khanthi, Lord of Phuan. As in Viangchan ten years before, the temples of the region had been plundered and desecrated in a search for loot—a sight greatly distressing to the humane and aesthetic McCarthy, who notes that ‘the wats had been wantonly destroyed, and piles of palm-leaf records lay heaped together, which, unless soon looked at, would be lost forever’. Similarly, during his visit to Siangkhwang - the capital of Phuan, and at this time under the sway of the Haw - McCarthy notes:

The pagoda on the hill, the finest in the region, had not escaped. From a distance it looked perfect, but on a near approach rents were found on three sides, almost from the pinnacle to the foundation. It was wonderful that the spire, 60 feet high, had not fallen in. The Haw are said to have obtained as much as 7000 rupees weight in gold from this pagoda. Fragments of urns, which had contained offerings, lay strewn about, and still showed elegance of form...

The surveyor, a longstanding admirer of Thai and Lao culture who was deeply distressed by the misery and destruction he encountered, concludes that ‘the Muang Puan population exhibited refinement in all they did, but their elegant taste was of no avail against the rude barbarian’. During his stay in Siangkhwang McCarthy was able to talk with Čhao Khanthi and other leading officials of Phuan; he was also shown a proclamation posted by the Haw ‘written in Lao, and having a square Chinese seal’, which ‘called upon the inhabitants to come out and acknowledge the Haw authority, threatening death without escape in case of disobedience, for whoever fled to Luang Prabang would be pursued and seized’. As a result of his enquiries into the origin and purpose of the Haw invaders, McCarthy was able to conclude that ‘Čhao Fa Wong, the Governor of Yunan’ (presumably Ts’ en Yū-ying, the contemporaneous
Viceroy of Yunnan and Kweichow) ‘was, in fact, the head and centre of their scandalous proceedings’, and that ‘when the French were at war in Tonkin he sent orders to the band of ruffians wandering over the Luang Prabang district, commanding them at their peril to attack the French’.\footnote{16}

Subsequently, after visiting Thatom which he found plundered and burned, the inhabitants having been carried off as forced labour to the main Haw stockade at Thung Chiangkham, McCarthy travelled to Luang Phrabang for consultations with the Siamese military commanders and Chao Unkham. Here it was learned that the ‘Flag Gangs’ had advanced to Mū' ang You, which should have been defended by troops under Phrayā Sukhothai, but this latter official being ill with malaria had withdrawn to Luang Phrabang, as a result of which the Haw were able to seize the outpost and to burn the Siamese stockades. Indeed, by this time of year with the onset of the rainy season in June and July, malaria was to prove a more potent foe in the Laotian uplands than the much-feared Haw; in McCarthy’s own words ‘the rain poured down steadily, and sickness prevailed’. Accordingly, the Siamese troops stationed in the Laos region remained in Luang Phrabang or withdrew across the Maekhong to Nongkhai whilst McCarthy, smitten by the death from malaria of his young English assistant George Bush, withdrew to Bangkok to report to King Chulalongkorn and await the return of the dry winter months.\footnote{17}

After reporting to Chulalongkorn and receiving the thanks and condolences of that monarch, McCarthy was ordered to return to Luang Phrabang at the end of the rainy season and ‘to consult with the two military commanders, Phrayā Rajchawaranakul and Phrayā Pichai, who had been desired to take vigorous steps for the suppression of the Haw, to look after the safety of the survey party, and to render every assistance’ Accordingly, having set out from Bangkok in November, 1884, McCarthy travelled to Luang Phrabang via Uttaradit and Nan, arriving on January 14, 1885, only to find that the Luang Phrabang contingent of the anti-Haw forces had already set out for Thung Chiangkham under the command of Phrayā Phichai. Meanwhile Phraya Raj had similarly set out for Phuan from his base at Nongkhai, for it had been arranged that the two contingents of the Siamese expeditionary force ‘should reach Thung Chiangkham on a fixed day, and in concert attack the stockade of the Haw, if the latter would not surrender’. Difficulties of transport aside, differences in character between the two Siamese commanders made the attainment of this objective highly unlikely. As McCarthy explains:

Phrayā Raj had spent his youth in the precincts of the count, and was annoyed that he had been appointed to act in concert with Phrayā Pichai, who was a country-bred man. Besides, he had a thorough contempt for the Haw, and was quite persuaded that his mere presence would make them flee or surrender. Consequently he took things in a rather leisurely way, and, like the great Napoleon, depended on the enemy
for supplies. Phrayâ Pichai (by contrast) was anxious to carry out his orders to the letter, so he hurried along a very rough route, over mountains and down rivers, with a large and scantily provisioned body of men, and reached Thung Chiangkham on the day appointed.\textsuperscript{18}

The late arrival of Phrayâ Rat's force, although in itself not a complete disaster, was symptomatic of the senior Thai commander's underestimation of the fighting abilities of the Haw as well as of his own, rather casual, approach to military campaigning. In the event, Phrayâ Phichai (a great friend of McCarthy, but characterised by the surveyor as being 'utterly unaccustomed to command') found himself 'at the head of an undisciplined rabble' and 'irritated the Haw into assuming an attitude of resistance'. Phrayâ Phichai therefore set about building a stockade some two miles distant from the well-fortified position of the Haw, where 'he remained for a month, awaiting the arrival of his worthy colleague, who was loitering and amusing himself by the way'. McCarthy continues:

Phrayâ Raj in course to time appeared at Thung Chiangkham, unfortunately in great wrath with "the country general", as he called his colleague. The "country general" had an unpleasant time, but he did all he could to bring matters to a successful issue. He placed himself unreservedly under Phrayâ Raj. who made a new stockade about 500 yards further on than the other. Phrayâ Raj was fully persuaded about the mere knowledge of his arrival had been enough for the Haw, and that they had already deserted their stockade, his scouts having reported that there was not so much as the sound of a fowl to be heard there. He went out to make a reconaissance in person, but when he got within rifle range a shower of bullets convinced him that the place was not deserted, and he had to beat a hasty retreat. Then he formed his plans for attacking the Haw, and getting rid of them, as he said, in half an hour.\textsuperscript{19}

It was at this point that McCarthy and his party arrived from Luang Phrabang, in time both to witness the outbreak of hostilities, and to involve themselves in the pursuit of a siege of the Haw stockade which was to last fully three months before ending in failure. For Phrayâ Raj had indeed underestimated his foes; as was later to become clear, some "Flag Bandits" were excellently armed with modern repeating rifles and Birmingham-manufactured ammunition, whilst many or all were skilled in gueirilla warfare involving demoralising tactics such as the mutilation and subsequent release of captives, the employment of bamboo panji or sharpened bamboo-stake traps, and surprise night attacks.\textsuperscript{20} Magic, also, was a potent weapon, believed in and resorted to by both sides. Thus McCarthy reports the killing of a local khamu (Khmu) woman by the Haw because she was pregnant and 'it was believed that the blood of an unborn baby rendered the power r with which it was mixed unfailing in the
destruction of life'. Similarly round silver tical coins were used as bullets since these, too, 'were charmed to render them fatal'.

The oracles accompanying Phrayā Raj’s troops determined ten o’clock on the morning of February 22, 1884, as the most auspicious time for the commencement of the Siamese attack. Accordingly, at this pre-determined time the first gun was fired and the attacking forces began their advance against the main Haw stronghold, a well-defended stockade some 400 metres long and 200 metres broad, surrounded by bamboos and guarded by seven watchtowers each about 12 metres high. North, west and east were open rice fields, whilst to the south was jungle. the Laotian and Siamese troops advanced in companies of about 50 men, each under the Banner of the White Elephant, and established themselves behind a temporary pallisade only 100 metres distant from the Haw fortifications. Since the attacking forces were armed with Armstrong six-pounder mountain howitzers these tactics can only be explained by lack of ammunition. Certainly McCarthy noted that most of the firing seemed to be coming from the Haw stocktowers, and despite their abundant courage and almost reckless indifference to injury, ‘considerable execution’ was done amongst the attacking forces, whilst the “Flag Bandits” seem to have remained relatively unscathed. At two o’clock in the afternoon the Siamese suffered a further setback when their commander-in-chief, Phrayā Raj, was injured by a shot, ‘weighing about two pounds, which glanced off the post of a Chinese joss-house where he was standing and struck him in the leg’.

Phrayā Raj’s wound proved seriously incapacitating, and from this time ‘the Siamese settled down to a regular siege’. Charges were made on the Haw stockade, but as the Nongkhai and Luang Phrabang contingents did not act in concert with each other these were repulsed with heavy losses, whilst ‘the stockade of the Siamese was daily filling with wounded’. The Dane, Rossmunsen and an English friend of McCarthy, Collins, served the attacking force as doctors, labouring under atrocious conditions and ‘dressing the wounds of about forty men daily’. As time passed and conditions deteriorated, tigers appeared and carried off two of the besieging forces. Matters were worse at night, when a desultory fire was kept up in an attempt to demoralise the Haw, though apparently to little effect. McCarthy notes that during the hours of darkness ‘when I, though well-clothed and dry, shivered with cold’ the Siamese troops ‘lay on the wet ground without any covering’. Supplies remained a constant problem; rations were limited to a few ounces of rice a day besides whatever might be picked up in the forest—‘yet there was never a murmur heard nor a word of complaint’. To add to these problems:

The HAW had a trick of making sorties at night, each man carrying in his hand a small canvas bag holding about two ounces of powder. These they would ignite and throw amongst the Siamese. The flash enabled them to see their victims, whom they would spear, and then
creep back to the stockade. The others would ‘blaze’ away in the direction of the flashes, and in this way they often killed and wounded one another.\(^\text{24}\)

Various attempts were made to fire the enemy stockade, though ultimately to no avail. Thus, ‘one day when all was quiet’, at the suggestion of Rossmunsen and McCarthy, bamboo towers were built opposite the stockade from which heated shot was fired into the thatch of the Haw watchtowers; after the first of these structures had been set afire, however, the Haw perceived the danger and ‘in an incredibly short time’ tore the roofs of the remaining six towers. Subsequently a great quantity of firewood was collected by the attacking forces with a view to firing the walls of the Haw stockade, but before this plan could be put into effect, the Chinese set fire to the stockpiled fuel, causing further casualties amongst the Siamese.\(^\text{25}\)

To add to these difficulties, word was received of an impending counter-attack by fresh Haw forces (presumably “Yellow Flags”) stationed at Sop-aet. Having abandoned hope of a swift and successful conclusion to hostilities, McCarthy did his best to persuade Phraya Raj to abandon the siege, but to no avail. The Siamese commander-in-chief was clearly shocked that McCarthy should propose such a course of action, restating his determination to drive out or capture the Haw invaders. In McCarthy’s words, ‘he was very obstinate, and expressed his determination to hang on’. Accordingly, McCarthy requested and received permission to proceed to Mū’ang Lai in order to survey the frontiers of Sipsongchuthai (and, thereby, the perceived north-eastern limits of Siamese suzerainty before the area could be taken by the advancing French). Before leaving Thung Chiangkham the surveyor records that he gave his tent to the wounded Siamese commander, who was suffering from the heat and from a ‘plague of flies’.\(^\text{26}\)

In the event, McCarthy was prevented from reaching Mū’ang Lai by lack of supplies; he reached Thaeng, however, which he found defended by “Black Flags” in the service of Kham Sinh, the Čhao Lai, who had built a stockade at Ban Khong Hua Lai, on a small eminence to the north-east of the plain. These legitimised “Flag Troops” were under the command of Pu Ye Pao, a close confidant of the Čhao Lai, and were the confirmed enemies of the Haw of Thung Chiangkham. Accordingly, McCarthy and Phraya Phichai, who had accompanied him—were received courteously and provided with supplies whilst exchanging messages with Kham Sinh; this latter sent two of his favourite sons, Kham Kui and Kham La, bearing ‘very satisfactory’ affirmations of Sipsongchuthai’s loyalty to Siam, as well as presents of ‘excellent ponies’ for McCarthy, Phraya Phichai, and the Čhao Thaeng. Following these exchanges and further pleasantries, and with the impending onset of the rainy season, McCarthy’s party turned south-westwards once again, reaching Luang Phrabang on June 1, 1885.\(^\text{27}\)

Meanwhile, further to the south, Phraya Raj’s brave but hopeless siege of
Thung Chiangkham dragged on until late May when, with their military objectives unfulfilled, the exhausted Siamese forces withdrew to Nongkhai, leaving the "Red Flag" and "Yellow Flag" Haw in possession of most of Phuan and Huaphanhatanghok.²⁸

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

I would like to thank Dr. Henry Ginsburg of the British Library, Department of Oriental Manuscripts and Printed Books, for his generous assistance in the preparation of this paper. I am also indebted to Professor P.B. Lafont of the IVe Section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Études (Sorbonne, Paris), for kindly assisting me in acquiring some of the Lao Sources used.

This paper was first read to the 10th International Historians of Asia Conference, Singapore, October 27-31, 1986.
END NOTES:


2. According to Prince Damrong Rajanubhab [Introductory Essay to Prachum Phongsawadan IX (Bangkok: Sophon Printers, 2461/1981), p.11], the Haw re-fortified their old base at Thung Chiangkham during this period (in 1883). According to the Laotian historian Mahasila Viravong, however [History of Laos, (New York: Paragon, 1964), p.141], the Haw had already 'effectively reoccupied Thung chiangkham for the second time' by 1877 A.D.

3. According to McCarthy: The HAW returned in great force and established control over M.Puann, denuded as it was of its population. Many of the people who escaped the exodus (i.e. the forced Siamese deportations of 1877) attached themselves to the HAW. Others, including the best of the men, took to the mountains. Nothing could induce them to leave their beautiful country, nor would they consent to acknowledge the HAW. [An Englishman's Siamese Journals, 1890-93 (Bangkok: Siam Media International, n.d.), p.158].

4. According to Viravong (History of Laos, p.142), Kwan-ko-yi was one of four lieutenants of the "Yellow Flag" leader Koh-yip-tai who refused to follow the example of their commander in surrendering to the emissaries of the "Black Flag" leader Liu Yung-fu at Son La in 1887, and who fled westwards towards Huaphanhatangk; it seems reasonable to assume that this is the same individual (though styled "Kwan Koryee") who is identified by Manich Jumsai as the Haw chieftain of Huaphanhatangk's Sop-aet region in 1885 [History of Laos, Including the History of Lannathai. Chiangmai (Bangkok: Chalermit, 1967) p.249]. Under these circumstances, Kwan-ko-yi and his Sop-aet followers should properly be identified as "Yellow Flags" and not (place Manich Jumsai) as "Black Flags".

5. Again, Manich Jumsai's identification of the Son La "Yellow Flag" leader as "Yipmantai" (History of Laos, Lannathai, Chiangmai, p.248) is problematical. It would seem reasonable to assume that this individual was, in fact, none other than the old "Yellow Flag" commander at Son La (and "henchmen of Puang Nansi" / Huang Ch'ung-ying), Yip-tai (or Ko-yip-tai), though this would be at a variance with Viravong's report of Ko-yip-tai's surrender, in 1877 to Liu Yung-fu's "Black Flags" at Lao Cai. Perhaps, following his 1877 submission, Ko-yip-tai took advantage of Liu Yung-fu's preoccupation with the French to slip away westwards, back to his old power base at Son La; Alternatively, the Chronology may be confused.


9. In his 'The Military, Government and Society in Siam, 1868-1910: Politics and Military Reform During the Reign of King Chulalongkorn' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1974), p.251, Noel Battye comments that 'for reasons as yet unknown, no punitive force left Bangkok'; Prince Damrong Rajanubhab (Prachum Phongsawadan, IX, p.12) notes, however that he would have accompanied this expedition himself 'but when news came that the Haw force was smaller than it had previously been, the main army did not go'; cf. Terwiel, A History of Modern Thailand, (St. Lucia, Queensland University Press, 1983), p.248.


11. Other Europeans accompanying the 1884-85 Expedition included Lieutenant Rossmunsen of the Danish Artillery and Louis Leonowens (son of Anna Leonowens of "King and I" renown), who commanded an escort of 200 soldiers detailed to protect McCarthy's surveying expedition. For a brief account of
Leonowens' activities in Laos during this period, see Chapter V ('Jungle Pursuit') of W.S. Bristowe's *Louis and the King of Siam* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1976), pp.48-54.

12. McCarthy left Bangkok for the North-East on January 16, 1884, travelling by way of Saraburi, Khorat and Nongkhai; he visited Vangchian, Siangkhwang and Luang Phrabang before returning to Bangkok, via Uttaradit, in July of the same year. The most comprehensive account of this expedition may be found in McCarthy's *Surveying and Exploring in Siam*, (London: John Murray, 1900), pp.18-77, but see also *An Englishman's Siamese Journals*, p.148.


14. Ibid., p.47; McCarthy's puzzled astonishment on discovering the great earthenware funerary urns of the "Plain of Jars" during this part of his journey (pp.48-9), though not strictly relevant to a study of the Haw Wars, makes fascinating reading.

15. Ibid., p.51.


17. McCarthy, *Surveying and Exploring in Siam*, pp.55, 59, 72; *An Englishman's Siamese Journals*, pp.149-50, where McCarthy notes the burial of Bush in the precincts of That Luang and the subsequent death in Luang Phrabang, also from Malaria, of Phraya Phichai.


20. According to McCarthy, Siamese forces subsequently operated against "Black Flag" elements north-east of Luang Phrabang who (were) 'excellently armed with Remingtons, Martini-Henries, Sniders; and repeating rifles, and their ammunition is of the best, being all solid brass cartridges from Kynoch, of Birmingham' ('Siam', p.128). The same author reports the widespread use of mutilation as a weapon of terror by the Haw, e.g. the case of 'an unfortunate Khamu (who) has been seized, his fingers and ears cut off, and the mutilated victim sent back as a warning to those who were carrying supplies' (*Surveying and Exploring in Siam*, p.87; *An Englishman's Siamese Journals*, p.165). The use of 'sharpened bamboos to cause fearful wounds in the naked feet of the soldiers' is reported by Bristowe in *Louis and the King of Siam*, p.52.


25. Ibid.

